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In Ref. 1, Balygin and his coworkers consider a faked-
state attack with detector blinding on Bennett-Brassard
1984 (BB84) quantum key distribution (QKD) protocol.
They propose a countermeasure to this attack in a phase-
coded system that watches for an abnormally low num-
ber of detections in the outer time slots 1 and 3. If the
eavesdropper does not pay attention to the outer time
slots, the countermeasure will reveal that the attack is
being performed (see Secs. 6, 7, and Fig. 1(b) in Ref. 1).
This approach is conceptually similar to earlier work on
non-blinding attacks [2].
However, in the faked-state attack [3] the eavesdrop-
per Eve uses a replica of Bob’s setup to detect all quan-
tum states emitted by Alice, then induces her exact de-
tection results in Bob’s apparatus. Since Eve is using
a replica of Bob’s setup, she would register detections
in the outer time slots, then induce the same detec-
tion results in Bob’s apparatus by resending additional
bright light pulses centered in the time slots 1 and/or 3.
Note that Eve will occasionally register a double click,
i.e., simultaneous detection events in both her detec-
tors caused by dark counts or multiphoton pulses from
Alice. She may also in some implementations register
multiple clicks in adjacent time slots. She might induce
such multiple clicks in Bob using faked states similar to
those constructed for distributed-phase-reference proto-
cols [4]. I.e., Eve might even replicate imperfections such
as double clicks and dark counts that would exist in Bob’s
equipment. This would mean that Bob’s detection events
are exactly the events measured by a copy of Bob’s setup
(conditioned on Bob’s basis choice), and are therefore in-
distinguishable from the detection events without the at-
tack. The statistics of these detections at Bob would thus
be indistinguishable from the statistics without the attack,
and the countermeasure is ineffective.
Although the search for technical countermeasures
against the attacks on detectors continues [5–9], so far
the only practical scheme proven to be immune against
these attacks is measurement-device-independent QKD
[10, 11].
We finally make a minor remark that Ref. 1 uses a sim-
plified model of the blinded detector with a single thresh-
old Pth at which it begins to make clicks with a non-zero
probability. In actuality, the click probability increases
gradually at powers higher than that, and there is an-
other threshold Palways > Pth at which it becomes unity
[5, 12]. Although this detail is inconsequential for the
argument presented in Ref. 1, it will have to be heeded
when constructing the actual attack.
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